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RICHARD WALSH
The Narration of Scientific Facts
If there is a meaningful concept of scientific fact, it is one that cuts across
the more careful standard distinction between scientific observation and
scientific theory. That is, there are both empirical scientific facts (water at a
pressure of one atmosphere boils at 100 degrees centigrade) and principled
general scientific facts (cell theory describes the fundamental structure of
living organisms). Both observations and theories may come to be regard-
ed as factual within a scientific community; the sense of ‘fact’ that applies,
though, is not only more rigorous but also more skeptical than factuality
as ordinarily understood. To call a fact ‘scientific’ is not exactly to say that
it is a more absolute fact (as common usage implies), but rather that it is
a more accountable fact. The rigorous aspect of this accountability is se-
cured by the methodical standards of science: theories must be testable,
and be extensively tested; particular observations must meet the criteria of
established practice in the relevant field and hence be, at least in principle,
reproducible. The skepticism that attaches to the notion of fact in science
is just the flip side of the accountability. Scientific theories have to be
falsifiable to be testable, and their legitimacy is not a matter of confirma-
tion, strictly speaking, but of demonstrated robustness in the face of efforts
at falsification. As the Popperian doctrine of falsificationism has it, scientif-
ic facts are not ultimately confirmed, so much as tested beyond reasonable
doubt (2002 [1959]).
There are pragmatic dimensions to such factuality: theories are account-
able within the scope of their applicability, within certain degrees of ap-
proximation, and within the limits of the questions they answer, and these
considerations are contingent upon the current agenda of research in the
relevant fields. A robust theory is one that is too well tested to be worth
further testing, but that criterion is relative to a given state of the science.
Scientific facts, then, are part of the discourse of knowledge, and there is
an irreducible conceptual gap between facts in that sense and the states of
affairs with which they are concerned.
This point is similarly applicable at the level of scientific observations.
They are factual to the extent that they are independent of the circumstan-
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tial variables of a particular act of observation, a criterion of objectivity
secured by the accountability of observation to standards of in-principle
reproducibility. Yet ‘objectivity’ here clearly cannot mean independence
from the human perspective as such. Observations do not present the
reality or state of affairs itself, but the phenomenon as registered by our
senses or their technological extensions, our instruments; this is inherent
in the status of observations as knowledge. Empiricism is founded upon
the evidential basis of knowledge, but its practice is also framed by the
contingencies of currently prevailing systems of knowledge. Theories must
hang together; observations, and methods of observation, must be consis-
tent. Science is above all systematic, which means (counterintuitively) that
precisely to the extent that it is cumulative, it privileges a coherence theory
rather than correspondence theory of truth (see / II.2 Bartmann, / II.1
Klauk).1 Note that to say so is not to opt for philosophical idealism rather
than realism; unlike the former, both coherence and correspondence theo-
ries of truth are (in their scientific manifestations) finally accountable to
empirical data. Both concern the relation of knowledge to reality, but
whereas correspondence theories conceive this relation atomistically, point
by point, coherence theories conceive of it holistically, as the adequacy of
a domain of knowledge to its object. This premium upon coherence is
confirmed, not refuted, by the fact that scientific paradigms are occasional-
ly superseded by more inclusive or more finely granular explanatory frame-
works.
Factuality, as a property of discourses, does not apply simply to what
is, but rather to what can be truly said about what is. Truth, being neces-
sarily couched within terms of some conceptual framework, is implicated
in considerations of form; and narrative form is a case in point, one that
is both ubiquitously invoked and deeply problematic. Scientific facts come
into relation with narrative for two kinds of reason, one having to do with
explanation, the other with communication. The former is the privileged
use of narrative in science education, while the latter is dominant in science
communication, though of course both modes are invoked in both con-
texts. My distinction here, despite the apparent compatibility of explana-
tion and communication, is actually an antithetical one. The choice be-
tween these two uses of narrative involves two alternative premises about
its function: narrative explanation assumes that the form and logic of nar-
rative are adequate to the scientific facts under consideration; whereas
narrative communication assumes that narrative form and logic are intelli-
1 For a philosophical overview of the history of scientific method, see Gower (1997);
on the systematic nature of science, see Hoyningen-Huene (2013).
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gible to the intended audience, graspable in a way not afforded by the facts
themselves (that is, non-narrative articulations of factuality: laws, statistics,
systemic distributions of data, formulae, etc.). The value of narrative expla-
nation, then, depends upon the congruence between narrative form and
the facts; the value of narrative communication depends upon the differ-
ence between them.
In broad theoretical terms, the incompatibility between narrative and
scientific knowledge is a familiar idea. It is the premise of Jean-François
Lyotard’s argument in The Postmodern Condition, which characterizes the
postmodern crisis of delegitimation as a result of the way science has
defined its own authority and integrity in opposition to narrative knowl-
edge, only to find that the project of science itself rests upon metanarra-
tives that must themselves fall within the scope of its skepticism, or its
“incredulity” towards narrative (1984 [1979], xxiv; also see / III.11 Bor-
relli). The impossibility of an objective narrative of facts has also been
played out in Hayden White’s critique of historiography (1987), which
argues that narrative history can never be just the exposition of historical
fact because narrative is intrinsically evaluative discourse, and the sources
of its value system are not the empirical world of historical events but the
discursive forms (the genres, tropes, and archetypes) of cultural narratives
(see / III.4 Jaeger). Despite the occasional rhetorical excesses of these
theorists, however, such considerations do not conflate narrative in general
with fiction. These are issues native to the discourses of narrative factuality.
While the qualities of narrative as cultural discourse do have some
purchase upon the pursuit of scientific knowledge, narrative is more rele-
vant (though no less problematic) when taken as fundamentally a mode
of cognition.2 The convergence between narratology and cognitive science
has increasingly located the roots of narrative sense-making in embodied
cognitive behavior, a full account of which would need to encompass
evolutionary and developmental parameters as well as cultural contexts.
Narrative cognition is the form in which we grasp process, and so conceive
of temporality; it has an irreducible relation to what it means to make
sense of these things. Nonetheless, it does not require much reflection to
see that it is not the only way of conceptualizing time and process, since
other conceptual frameworks have currency within certain fields of inquiry,
and indeed in general cultural discourse. There are systems models and
probabilistic models of process; tensed models of time that situate the past
2 A succinct definition of narrative cognition, avoiding presupposition of everything that
is consequent upon thinking narratively, would be “the semiotic articulation of linear
temporal sequence” (Walsh 2018, 12).
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and future relative to a changing ‘now’ (or ‘A-series’ time, in philosophical
parlance, in contrast with the spatialized timeline of ‘B-series’ or calendric
time); as well as four-dimensional conceptions of time, among others.3
Such ideas can be intuitive as well as intellectual, but their intelligibility
nonetheless remains, more or less overtly, in dialogue with a narrative
mode of understanding. Narrative is the elemental form on which we draw
whenever something happens, to the extent that to make sense of events,
in basic cognitive terms, is just to grasp them together as a narrative.
Yet narrative form is not neutral or transparent to phenomena: it estab-
lishes hierarchies of salience and axes of relation, as any sense-making
activity must, and these have tendentious features at a far more fundamen-
tal level than the narrative qualities that were of concern to Lyotard and
White. It is not just that our narrative understanding is conditioned by the
familiar devices and templates we have assimilated from dominant cultural
forms of narrative; the bare possibility of narrative form itself entails sig-
nificant and prejudicial epistemological commitments. Narrativity, in this
cognitive context, is best regarded as the name for those effects intrinsic
to thinking narratively, rather than as a measure of the extent to which a
given discourse possesses the qualities of a narrative. So, perhaps the most
elemental feature of narrative cognition is its anthropocentrism, which is
manifest in the human scale of its reference frame and its projection of
literal or figurative experientiality upon any subject matter whatever, in
forms ranging from the implicit attribution of agency to full-blown anthro-
pomorphism. Anthropocentrism of some kind is inherent to the meaning-
fulness of any human cognitive construct, but it is also bound up with the
contingencies of our evolutionary past in intellectually constraining ways.
But the distinctive logic of narrative is not only a product of the circum-
stantial criteria of competitive advantage in a state of nature, it is also
reflexively self-confirming: every individual narrative is intelligible as an
instance of a narrative pattern that is itself an abstraction from narrative
instances. This reciprocity between the particular and the general is intrin-
sic to narrative meaning, but the consequent hermeneutic circle necessarily
constrains the empiricism of narrative cognition. For example, narrative’s
privileging of sequential relations as a sense-making principle not only
obscures other kinds of process, but also relies upon irreducibly implicit
3 On the incompatibility between systemic and narrative models of process, see Stepney
and Walsh (2018). On the variety of possible conceptions of time (not all of which are
decisively aligned with, or incompatible with, narrative understanding), see Markosian
(2016). For a helpful discussion of time in philosophy, see the first chapter of Currie
(2007).
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connective principles, most obviously our innate model of causal inference.
These effects arise from the conceptual primacy of form in narrative cogni-
tion, and while the successful imposition of such form is the condition for
narrative understanding, it is not just limiting but actually debilitating when
attempting to understand processes that are remote from the ordinary
experience of an intelligent social animal. Yet challenges of this sort are
necessarily presented by, for example, the sciences of the very large or
small, the very fast or slow, or just the systemically complex.4
Narrative’s affordances and limitations impinge upon the narration of
scientific facts at the level of theory and at that of observation, and both
cases foreground the tension between narrative’s explanatory and commu-
nicative functions. So, the task when articulating scientific theories is typi-
cally both to exemplify, and to do so in terms that are assimilable to a
human experiential frame of reference. Two classic examples of such nar-
ratives are the ‘twin paradox,’ as an illustration of the principle of time
dilation consequent upon the special theory of relativity; and ‘Schrödinger’s
cat,’ as a thought experiment concerned with the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics.
A partial version of the problem that became known as the twin para-
dox was set out by Einstein, using clocks, in his 1905 paper introducing
special relativity, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” (1989
[1905]); the twins themselves were introduced by Paul Langevin in 1911,
although Einstein had already implicitly done so by referring to identically
constituted living organisms in a 1911 lecture elaborating upon his earlier
account.5 Briefly told, the story of the twins is this: one twin goes on a
long journey through space at near light speed, while the other remains
on earth; the traveling twin returns to find the earth-bound twin is now
significantly older.6 The age difference is due to time dilation, a theoretical
(and empirically testable) consequence of special relativity; a clock traveling
at speed relative to another clock runs more slowly, and the greater the
relative speed, the more pronounced the effect. The apparent paradox is
that, if motion is relative, both twins are traveling at speed relative to each
4 For a more thorough discussion of the range of implications to be drawn from a
definition of narrative in cognitive terms, see Walsh (2018).
5 A succinct and accessible exposition and resolution of the twin paradox is Lasky (2006);
a thorough discussion of the pedagogical challenges of explaining the paradox is given
in Shuler (2014); the history of Einstein’s own engagements with the problem is given
by Pesic (2003).
6 Note that here and subsequently my concern is with the bare narrative form of my
examples, not the extent to which they exhibit the qualities we associate with novelistic
fiction.
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other, and so time should pass more slowly for each relative to the other.
Why do the two effects not cancel each other out?
My purpose is not to be detained by the charm of the twin paradox,
much less by the physics that explains it, but to note the ways in which
narrative interacts with scientific theory here. Einstein’s resort to a narra-
tive example in the first place had expository motives; it made the abstruse
mathematics of special relativity concrete and specific, and so made some
of its consequences tangible and particular. The example’s mutation from
clocks to twins is a predictable anthropocentric consolidation of its narra-
tivity, serving both to express time dilation as an experiential reality rather
than a mathematical abstraction, and to make it significant on a human
scale. At the same time, it is precisely this narrative move that foregrounds
the more disconcerting and fantastical aspects of the idea. The story of
the twins is in one sense a literal extrapolation of the implications of time
dilation, but it is the human scale of this presentation that requires the
appeal to near light-speed space travel (to produce time dilation effects of
a perceptible magnitude), and so introduces an element of science fiction.
By accommodating human scale in one respect, the example exceeds it in
another, and shades from narrative explanation into a form of narrative
communication that emphasizes the exoticism of the theory.
Einstein himself drew attention to this rhetorical shift in his own 1911
elaboration upon the story, describing it as presenting “the thing at its
funniest” (Pesic 2003, 586). The story is no longer offering direct access
to the theory, so much as providing the vehicle for an imaginative leap.
In this guise, the narration of scientific facts works less as an instance of
direct factuality than as a form with some of the qualities of parable, the
figurative projection of one story onto another (Turner 1996). A parable
is cast in terms accessible to understanding in ways that the target domain
is not; all narrative presentation of theory has this character in a sense,
being a projection of the concrete or particular onto the abstract or gener-
al. Since its explanatory power depends upon difference, however, it also
greatly increases the potential for inappropriate inferences, and misinter-
pretation. The ‘paradoxical’ quality of the twin paradox is itself an instance
of such mistaken inference, the root of which is not the issue of scale, but
the bare fact of narrative’s anthropocentric perspectivalism. Attempts to
disentangle the example from paradox have taken a surprising variety of
directions, all of them struggling to reconcile the mathematical theoretical
framework with narrative form, which both makes it accessible and resists
it. In essence the apparent asymmetry between the experiences of the two
twins is explained by the fact that the space traveling twin’s out-and-back
journey necessarily involves a change of inertial frame of reference that
does not apply to the earth-bound twin. The irreducible relativity of inertial
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frames of reference is at the heart of special relativity; there is no absolute
temporality, no absolute present, and so the axis of simultaneity between
the two twins need not correspond to equivalent elapsed time. Yet the
story of the twins, as a story, inherently posits the third-person frame of
reference of the narration itself, and so continues to insinuate an absolute
space-time in defiance of the main point of the narrative. In a more ab-
stract sense, the function of parable itself, which is to conceptually synthe-
size discrete frames of reference, is what dooms the narrative to misrepre-
sentation.
Erwin Schrödinger (1980 [1935]) had different motives for his recourse
to narrative in the case of Schrödinger’s cat, and the contrast offers an
illuminating comparison with the twin paradox. Briefly, this thought ex-
periment involves placing a cat in a sealed box, along with a Geiger counter
rigged to release poisonous gas when it detects the decay of a single atom
of radioactive material – an event which has an equal probability of occur-
ring or not occurring in the course of an hour. After one hour the box is
opened, to reveal either a live or dead cat, but until that point its fate is
indeterminate. In accordance with the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, one would say that until it is observed it is both alive and
dead. Narrative has a mixed role in Schrödinger’s thought experiment, just
as it does in the twin paradox. On the one hand, it offers a literal extension
of the idea of quantum superposition to macro-scale events; on the other
hand, it serves as a reductio ad absurdum of the Copenhagen interpretation,
in the form of a parable about the role it attributes to observation in the
collapse of the wave function.
In Einstein’s case, then, the narrative was intended to be expository
for a general audience, and the appearance of paradox was an unfortunate
effect of presenting the theory in narrative form. Schrödinger’s technical
scientific paper did not require narrative exposition; in this case the narra-
tive was introduced as a refutation of the theory (or rather, of certain
interpretations of the theory), and its paradoxical quality is very much the
point. Although Schrödinger offered no definite alternative reading of his
own wave function equation, he (like Einstein) was a scientific realist; his
refusal to countenance the idea of a cat that is simultaneously dead and
alive is a refusal to accept that reality has no definite form independent of
observation. Yet his appeal to the macro-scale coherence of narrative itself
takes the limits of human cognition to define what is to count as definite
form.
Schrödinger’s story has had an extensive afterlife not only in scientific
debate but also in general culture, including many readings that run entirely
counter to his own point, and the range of these responses has been
explored in detail by Marie-Laure Ryan (2011). They can be broadly charac-
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terized, though, in terms of the different ways they seize upon aspects of
the narrative presentation. Responses that focus upon the story’s extension
of quantum effects to the macro-scale have tended to look for principled
limits to the scope of superposition, or to pursue issues that remain implic-
it in Schrödinger’s version, such as what counts as observation. They take
the anthropocentric scale of narrative as too coarse-grained to capture
quantum reality, or they take the narrative to be problematic just because
it is incomplete. Responses that treat the story primarily as a parable, on
the other hand, have much more freely affirmed its paradoxical qualities, as
figurative expressions of concepts beyond the remit of narrative, whether
because it says too much (with respect to the radically discontinuous logic
of quantum physics), or too little (with respect to the supra-narrative ex-
cess of many-worlds ontologies).
The case of Schrödinger’s cat also broaches the question of the relation
between observation and theory; between the two distinct frames within
which scientific factuality can apply. Theories are built upon observations,
and the regularities revealed by observations, but observation is never in-
nocent of theory; without some theoretical frame of reference, observa-
tions are meaningless. This reciprocity between observation and theory is
echoed in the way narrative meaning depends upon a reciprocal relation
between the particulars of a given narrative and the abstract model of
narrative form – that is, its logic of sequentiality and the manifold corolla-
ries of that logic. Narrative is itself a theory-laden form of explanation,
though it is theory-like in a largely unexamined way.
I can now turn to an example of the narrative representation of obser-
vations as scientific facts, keeping in mind not only the principled reciproc-
ity between scientific theory and observation, but also the analogous reci-
procity between narrative particulars and narrative form. My example
accentuates the reversal from top-down to bottom-up conception implied
in the move from theory to observation, and declines a long way from the
heady intellectual realms of special relativity and quantum mechanics. It is
a recent piece of research published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society,
and picked up by the BBC and other media channels, titled “The Roles of
Impact and Inertia in the Failure of a Shoelace Knot.” The paper’s account
of knot failure, as presented in the published abstract, is as follows:
First, the repeated impact of the shoe on the floor during walking
serves to loosen the knot. Then, the whipping motions of the free ends
of the laces caused by the leg swing produce slipping of the laces. This
leads to eventual runaway untangling of the knot. (Daily-Diamond et al.
2017, 1)
This rather bland summary in narrative form presents the results of
experimental observations, taken with a high-speed camera, of the laced
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shoes of subjects on treadmills – as well as a number of control experi-
ments.
There are both communicative and explanatory considerations in play
in this example. The research is engaged with applied knot theory and has
possible implications in other contexts, including surgical sutures, but its
choice of subject clearly has an appeal to the general public in mind. It
did indeed secure take up in the news media, but not as an effective
exercise in science communication; instead, it slotted into a well-estab-
lished stereotype of the wasteful irrelevance of science. A comment in
response to the BBC online coverage is representative: “I find it unbeliev-
able that (presumably) highly educated scientists are spending their time
on these petty questions. Any fool can tell you that if you walk about, the
movement of your feet will loosen laces” (BBC News 2017). This is a
typical science communication dilemma: the narrative presentation of re-
search is intended to maximize its accessibility, but mutates into banality.
The problem is aggravated in this case by the fact that sequential narrative
form tends to obscure the main finding of the research, which is the
combination of two distinct mechanisms in a cyclical positive feedback
loop. The researchers do gesture towards this feature in the narrative pre-
sentation of their findings to the media (“avalanche effect”; “catastrophic
failure”); but like the word “runaway” in the quote above, these efforts
inevitably generate comic overtones in relation to the subject of shoelaces.7
Even as explanation, then, the function of narrative here is problematic.
Despite the simplicity of the object of inquiry, an all-too-readily narratable
event, and the apparent compatibility between the bottom-up empiricism
of observation and a narrative presentation of facts, the scientific interest
eludes narrative articulation. The reason is not circumstantial but intrinsic
to the findings, which indicate that a systemic rather than sequential mod-
eling of the process is required, in order to express the reciprocal interac-
tion of mechanisms involved in the emergent effect of unraveling; that is
to say, the facts are recalcitrant to the logic of narrative representation.
But the problem goes beyond the circumstances of these particular
observations, and raises the question of what it is to be explanatory. On
the one hand, if narrative form is a feature of the explanans rather than of
the explanandum, of the mode of cognition rather than the cognized reality,
it is hard to see how it can be explanatory by virtue of being narrative
(Klauk 2016). On the other hand, causal inference (and therefore causal
7 Nicholson Baker’s extended meditations on shoelace wear and shoelace knots in The
Mezzanine conclude with a long footnote comically surveying extant research on the
subject (1988, 129–131). Thanks to Marie-Laure Ryan for this reference.
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explanation, surely the most paradigmatic form of explanation) is hard to
disentangle from narrative cognition. Causal inference is another name for
the conceptual leap necessary to the formal grasping together of every act
of narrative cognition; it is the archetypal implicit relation constituting
narrative wholes. Causal explanation, then, cannot be reduced to the invo-
cation of covering laws, as in the deductive-nomological model of explana-
tion; it is bound up with narrative cognition. This is not to say that causali-
ty is a projection of human subjectivity, but only that our conceptual
relationship to it is mediated, and constrained, by our dependence upon
narrative. Narrative factuality is the application of an innate theoretical
paradigm, and is explanatory, not by virtue of reference to states of affairs,
but just to the extent that it is itself pragmatically grounded and so continu-
ous with empiricism, if a restricted mode of it.8
The narrative explanation of scientific facts, from the most abstruse
theories to the most elementary observations, is a necessary but compro-
mising effort to make the specific affordances of a basic cognitive resource
adequate to the full scope of scientific inquiry. Such compromise leaves
unresolved a range of problems concerning narrative explanation and com-
munication, according to context; the former is at a premium in education,
for example, while the latter dominates science communication in the pub-
lic sphere. In an educational context there is some plausibility to the hy-
pothesis that narrative modes of representation not only enhance interest
and understanding by virtue of their accessibility, but also more effectively
take root in memory. But narrative explanation also tends, by privileging
relatability, to minimize the intellectual exposure to the unfamiliar (in the
subject matter and in the mode of explanation) that we might reasonably
consider essential to education itself (Norris et al. 2005). In a science com-
munication context, especially in mass media, these considerations are to
a large extent superseded by the way the rhetoric of narrative factuality
becomes entangled with the tendentiousness of news values and the ethics
of persuasion, both of which are fundamental motives behind the near-
ubiquitous recourse to narrative presentation of science for non-specialist
audiences (Dahlstrom 2014). It is not just that the cognitive accessibility
of narrative’s human scale becomes increasingly problematic for phenome-
na that diverge from that scale; but also that the affective power of narra-
tive form itself becomes a problem. David Velleman has argued that the
force of narrative “explanation” has to do with the emotional nature of
the grasping together of narrative wholes, and the sense of resolution they
8 For a ‘manipulationist’ view of causal explanation grounded in pragmatics and counter-
factual intervention, see Woodward (2004).
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offer: “Having sorted out its feelings toward events, the audience mistak-
enly feels that it has sorted out the events themselves: it mistakes emotion-
al closure for intellectual closure” (2003, 20). It is true that critical self-
consciousness about narrative can help guard against such tendencies, but
repudiating narrative form is not always a constructive move; it can all too
easily serve to reject explanation itself, and devalue the project of science.
Even as we recognize the need to regard narrative with suspicion, we
continue to depend upon it.
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